Decision support in interest based negotiation support systems: the AssetDivider system by Bellucci, Emilia & Zeleznikow, John
 DRO  
Deakin Research Online, 
Deakin University’s Research Repository  Deakin University CRICOS Provider Code: 00113B 
Decision support in interest based negotiation support systems: the 
AssetDivider system 
Citation:  
Bellucci, Emilia and Zeleznikow, John 2010, Decision support in interest based negotiation 
support systems: the AssetDivider system. In Yearwood, John and Stranieri, Andrew 
(ed), Technologies for supporting reasoning communities and collaborative decision making: 
cooperative approaches, IGI Global, Information Science Publisher, Hershey, Pa., pp.319-339. 
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-60960-091-4 
 
 
 
 
©2011, IGI Global 
Reproduced with permission. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Downloaded from DRO: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30032771  
319 
Chapter 1 7 
Decision Support in 
Interest Based Negotiation 
Support Systems: 
The AssetDivider System 
Emilia Bellucci 
Victoria University, Australia 
John Zeleznikow 
Victoria University, Australia 
ABSTRACT 
Negotiation Support Systems (NSS) model the process of negotiation from basic template support to 
more sophisticated decision making support. The authors attempt to develop systems capable of decision 
support by suggesting possible solutions for the given dispute. Current Negotiation Support Systems 
primarily rely upon mathematical optimisation techniques and often ignore heuristics and other methods 
derivedfrom practice. This chapter discusses the technology of several negotiation support systems in 
family law developed in their laboratory based on data collected and methods derivedfrom practise. The 
chapter explores similarities and differences between systems the authors have created and demonstrates 
their latest development, AssetDivider. 
INTRODUCTION 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is becom-
ing a popular way of resolving disputes quickly, 
amicably and economically. We defineADR as any 
process considered an alternative to public dispute 
resolution, for example as an alternative to court 
battles. The different forms of ADR include Ne-
gotiation, Mediation and Arbitration. Negotiation 
DOT: 10.40 18/978-1-60960-091-4.chO 17 
is often between the disputants themselves; there 
is no third party whose role is to act as facilitator 
or umpire in the communications between the 
parties as they attempt to resolve their dispute 
(Astor & Chinkin, 2002). Mediation involves a 
third party neutral, known as the mediator, to as-
sist parties in formulating their own resolution of 
the dispute. Arbitration is an adversarial process 
whereby an independent third party, after hearing 
submissions from the disputants, makes an award 
binding upon the parties. The arbitration process 
Copynght © 2011, IGI Global. Copymg or dlstnbutlllg 111 prlllt or electromc forms without wntten permIssIOn ofIGI Global IS proillblted. 
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could be as close to judicial determination as one 
can get (Charlton, 2000). 
Negotiation can be described as an avenue by 
which social conflict is resolved. Negotiation is 
often the first method of dispute resolution that 
is called upon to resolve social conflicts. The 
non-violent nature of negotiation (if conducted 
properly) explains why negotiation is often pre-
ferred to harsher substitutes such as court trials 
or violent war. 
There are a number of theories to describe 
how people should negotiate; the two major being 
Positional and Principled negotiation. Positional 
Negotiation is based on the premise that one takes 
a position in a dispute and argues it. Occasion-
ally concessions will be made in order to avoid 
a stalemate and ultimately any solution from the 
negotiation will reflect a win-lose (one disputant 
will win, while the other loses). Principled Ne-
gotiation, developed by the Harvard Negotiation 
Project, advocates proposing an argument based 
on the disputant's interests which support their 
position. It also promotes cooperation between 
disputants by advocating a joint search for options 
and objective criteria. Principled Negotiation is the 
most widely used negotiation theory in practise and 
as such we have used it as a basis to our research. 
Cooperative Negotiation describes the com-
munication of parties when the outcomes are the 
result of coordinated behaviour ofboth participants 
(Robertson et aI., 1990). Parties are more likely to 
be satisfied with (and most importantly adhere to) 
suggested solutions if they participated in reach-
ing the solution. Whilst reaching a solution can 
indicate a successful negotiation, more important 
is how well the parties adhere to the solution. Our 
research is based on the assumption that disputing 
parties co-operate in negotiation, hence increasing 
the likelihood that solutions arrived by negotiation 
are successfully implemented. 
Our work has focused on supporting the ne-
gotiation process through technology. Otherwise 
known as Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), we 
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have developed a number of computer systems to 
support the decision making aspect of negotiation. 
An emerging area within the realm of com-
puterised alternative dispute resolution is On-line 
Dispute Resolution (ODR). ODR systems are 
web-enabled, primarily to provide parties who for 
various reasons cannot or should not meet face-to-
face, with the opportunity to conduct negotiations 
and to facilitate easier and faster communication. 
We see Negotiation Support Systems as a subset 
of On-line Dispute Resolution systems, since ne-
gotiation is viewed as a type of dispute resolution. 
This chapter will also classify NSS by the type 
of decision making it offers and how it models 
negotiation support on computer. The following 
section outlines the systems in each ofthese clas-
sifications, and not surprisingly, we will find many 
will overlap across classifications. 
In line with the theme of this book, we will 
focus on NSS that specifically support decision 
making, whether that be by simply enabling dis-
putants to communicate online to systems capable 
of proposing a solution to a dispute. Our review 
will not be limited to those providing support in 
Family Law (as there appears limited research 
outside our laboratory). 
We detail Principled Negotiation as our primary 
negotiation theory and link this with a thorough 
investigation ofNSS developed in our laboratory. 
Following this, we discuss the development of 
our latest computer system, AssetDivider and 
conclude with a brief description of future work 
currently being explored in our laboratory. 
NEGOTIATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
On-Line Negotiation 
Support Systems 
According to some early pioneers of Electronic 
NSS, conflict in the new internet environment 
seemed inevitable: "Cyberspace seemed to us to 
be too active, too entrepreneurial, too competitive, 
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and too lucrative a place for it not to have many 
conflicts" (Katsh & Rifkin, 2001). In particular, 
the continual growth in the development ofthe In-
ternet has lead to increased numbers of Electronic 
NSS. (Bichler et aI., 2003) describes electronic 
negotiations as 'processes that involve computer 
and communication technologies in one or more 
negotiation activities'. These technologies include 
the use of e-mail and multimedia, databases, 
decision support systems and knowledge-based 
systems. On-line NSS can be classified into the 
following categories: Web-based NSS, On-line 
Auctions, Automated Negotiation and Automated 
Agent-based Negotiations. 
Web-based NSS refer to systems implementing 
the use of email and visual aids such as multime-
dia objects to facilitate effective communication 
between disputants. Negotiation support packages 
assist parties to overcome the challenges of con-
ventional negotiation through a range of analyti-
cal tools to clarify interests, identify tradeoffs, 
recognise party satisfaction and generate optimal 
solutions (Thiessen & McMahon, 2000). Their aim 
was to better prepare parties for negotiation or to 
support them during the negotiation process. A 
primary player in this area is SmartSettle (www. 
Smartsettle.com), which uses graphs to illustrate 
the satisfaction ratings of disputants towards 
packages. INSPIRE (Kersten, 1997) was among 
the first electronic negotiation support systems 
developed. INSPIRE enabled disputants to ne-
gotiate through the Internet, making extensive 
use of email and web browser facilities. Another 
example of a text-based electronic negotiation 
support system is CBSS (Yuan et aI., 1998). The 
system enables 'full process support' by enabling 
communication in real-time through hot-line co-
ordination, message exchange and the editing of 
common documents. Both INSPIRE and CBSS 
are examples of On-line Systems that fully support 
the standard processes of negotiation. 
Automated negotiation involves a process of 
'blind bidding', where 'parties submit settlement 
offers and a computer program automatically noti-
fies them when a settlement is reached (Schultz et 
aI., 2001). A major provider of automated nego-
tiation is Cybersettle (www.cybersettle.com).It 
is an example of on-line NSS in the area oflegal 
claim settlement, that allows disputants to settle 
claim disputes by lawyers to choose the best op-
tion from three confidential offers provided by 
the claims professional. 
There are many advantages and disadvantages 
of using On-line NSS. One advantage includes 
the seemingly private submission of offers. Most 
systems allow party details, offers and demands 
to be kept confidential, so as to protect a parties' 
interest should negotiations fail. There is also a 
considerable reduction in time attending meet-
ings, and settlements are often achieved faster as 
on-line facilities operate continuously. Since the 
use of Internet technology tends to lower costs, 
it is also likely there will be a greater pool of as-
sets to distribute. Personality conflicts or human 
bias can be minimised using computer systems to 
facilitate negotiation due to the distance a com-
puter screen provides between disputing parties 
(Bellucci, 2004). 
Disadvantages include the necessary use of 
text-based communication methods, which may 
reduce important cues that can lead to misinter-
pretations, negative interpersonal behaviour and 
frustration. Online communication necessarily 
advantages those who are familiar and comfortable 
with online technology and tools. It is expected, 
though, that the continual and widespread use of 
the Internet throughout society will ensure fewer 
people continue to feel intimidated by on-line 
tools. 
Template vs. Decision 
(Making) Support Systems 
In classifying NSS (online or otherwise) with 
respect to how they model decision support, it 
is useful to categorise them into template and 
decision (making) support systems. The earliest 
Negotiation Support Systems were primarily 
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responsible for tracking past preferences and 
informing disputants about progress being made 
towards a solution to a conflict. We refer to these 
systems as template systems. DEUS (Zeleznikow 
etal., 1995), INTERNEG(Kersten, 1997), CBSS 
(Yuan et aI., 1998), Negotiator Pro and The Art 
of Negotiating (Eidelman, 1993) are all template 
based systems. 
DEUS (Zeleznikow et aI., 1995) represented 
our earliest attempt at building negotiation sup-
port systems in Australian Family Law. It is a 
template-based system that displays the level 
of disagreement between disputants. The model 
underpinning the program calculates the level of 
agreement and disagreement between the litigants' 
goals at any given time. The disputants reached 
negotiated settlement when the difference between 
the goals was reduced to nil. DEUS is useful to 
gain an understanding of what issues are in dispute 
and the extent of the dispute over these issues. 
Template systems are useful in the way they 
support human negotiation. It is the disputants 
who will be trying to resolve the dispute - not 
the computer system. DEUS for example calcu-
lated how much progress had been made in the 
negotiation as a way to motivate parties towards 
reaching a resolution. 
Early decision (making) support negotiation 
systems primarily used Artificial Intelligence 
techniques to model negotiation. LDS (Peterson 
& Waterman, 1985) used rule-based reasoning 
to assist legal experts in settling product liability 
cases. SAL (Waterman et aI., 1986) also used rule-
based reasoning to help insurance claim adjusters 
evaluate claims related to asbestos exposure. 
NEGOPLAN (Matwin et aI., 1989) is a rule based 
system written in PROLOG which advised upon 
industrial disputes in the Canadian paper indus-
try. Mediator (Kolodner & Simpson, 1989) used 
case retrieval and adaptation to propose solutions 
to international disputes, while PERSUADER 
(Sycara, 1993) integrated case based reasoning 
and decision-theoretic techniques to provide deci-
sion support to United States' industrial disputes. 
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Mediator, Persuader, NEGOPLAN and Fam-
ily _Negotiator are considered to be intelligent 
systems since they can generate solutions using 
the system's internal knowledge as well as users 
input. All incorporate some level of negotiation 
support, together with the ability to provide users 
with a resolution to the current problem. Solu-
tions from these systems can be used to compare 
against other proposals including those arrived at 
by human negotiation. This will give disputants 
more options when deciding on which solution 
is best for them. 
Artificial Intelligence techniques such as case-
based, rule-based and hybrid reasoning have had 
mixed degrees of success in providing negotiation 
support. The Mediator proved quite successful 
in its retrieval and adaptation of previous cases. 
NEGOPLAN used rule-based reasoning to suc-
cessfully model Canadian industrial disputes, 
while PERSUADER successfully modelled US 
industrial disputes through the use of a hybrid case 
and rule-based methodology. Family _Negotiator 
however, did not perform to its initial expectations, 
primarily due to its relatively simple modelling 
of the domain. 
Negotiation environments, in which a number 
of negotiation support services are available, 
are becoming increasingly popular. We have 
developed two major negotiation support sys-
tems IMODRE, an integrated multi-agent online 
dispute resolution environment (Abrahams et aI., 
2010), and Online Dispute Resolution Environ-
ment (Lodder & Zeleznikow, 2005). Lodder and 
Zeleznikow's On-line dispute environment uses 
a dialog system and negotiation support system 
(based on our research) to support the resolution 
of conflict. Both support dispute resolution by 
their ability to employ various services to resolve 
disputes amicably. 
Modelling Negotiation on Computer 
Yet another classification describes how the tech-
nology is modelled in NSS; whether we model 
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according to rational decision making (science) 
or human behaviour (social science). Numerous 
models have been developed from detailed studies 
of how peop le negotiate. Formal models, such as 
Game theory, rely upon a mathematical concept 
of optimal convergence. But do such models 
realistically simulate human behaviour? (Kalai 
& Stanford, 1988) notes 'humans are more cor-
rectly modelled as having bounded rationali ty, that 
is choosing strategies from less-than-complete 
considerations and striving for satisfactory rather 
than optimal levels of utility'. Game theory, for 
example, seems to ignore satisfaction as an 
underlying requirement of ensuring a mutually 
acceptable outcome. It supports a win-lose ap-
proach contrary to promoting cooperation among 
the parties. 
Similarly, (Raiffa, 2002) describes two major 
analysis techniques which could be applied to how 
negotiation is modelled on computers. 
1. Using normative analysis. This type of 
modelling uses rational decision making to 
model decisions. Researchers in normative 
analysis use economic theories and game 
theory to suggest solutions based on math-
ematical modelling. 
2. Using descriptive analysis. Descriptive 
analysis focuses on how decisions are made 
inreality. Researchers in descriptive analysis 
use models derived from heuristics and actual 
data to mimic the negotiation process. 
Examples of systems based on predominately 
normative advice include INSPIRE (Kersten, 
1997) and SmartSettle (Thiessen & McMahon, 
2000), which use Pareto Optimisation techniques 
to suggest optimal solutions. These contrast 
sharply with our work in negotiation support, 
namely Family _ Winner(Bellucci, 2004) andAsset 
Divider-our systems provide advice based on the 
way people negotiate or to help them make more 
informed decisions based on simple mathematics. 
Our goal is to provide feasible suggested solutions 
that are acceptable to the user, rather than search-
ing for purely optimal solutions. 
Negotiation Support Systems 
Developed in our Laboratory 
The underlying negotiation principle we have cho-
sen to model is Principled Negotiation, developed 
by the Harvard Negotiation Project'. Part of our 
data collection phase (detailed in (Bellucci, 2004)) 
included interviews with a number of mediators. 
One of the questions asked was on the principle 
of negotiation support they advocate and promote 
with their clients. All mediators emphasised the 
importance of collaboration and the search for 
common interests. As such, and in keeping with 
our goal to develop systems from actual experi-
ence, we have employed Principled Negotiation 
as the underlying theory to our Negotiation Sup-
port Systems. 
Principled Negotiation essentially emphases 
parties look for mutual gains. When interests 
conflict, Principled Negotiation advocates par-
ties arrive at a ruling that is independent of the 
beliefs of either side. The essential features of 
Principled Negotiation as a problem-solving task 
are as follows: 
Separate the people from the problem. This 
is to ensure that persons with stronger personali-
ties cannot influence others into a decision that 
is biased towards a party or group of parties. 
This aspect is perhaps most relevant in disputes 
between people who are involved in an on-going 
relationship, for example in family law disputes 
that concern the welfare of children. In modelling 
this aspect, we use the seemingly un-biased and 
removed medium of a computer screen to promote 
a sense of separation. 
Focus on interests, not on positions. Par-
ticipants must distinguish and make known their 
underlying values in order to justify their posi-
tion. In most negotiations, each party will have 
interests they would like satisfied by settlement, 
and it is important these be understood as sepa-
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rate from their positions. By isolating the reasons 
why a position is most appealing, participants in 
a negotiation will increase the chance of achiev-
ing agreement. We have chosen to use ratings to 
model interests (as is the case in Family_Winner 
and Asset Divider). 
Invent options for mutual gain. Even ifthe 
parties' interests differ, there may be bargaining 
outcomes that will advance the interests of both 
parties. Once interests have been ranked to de-
termine the relative importance of each, a range 
of options is discussed before deciding on an 
outcome. Next, the negotiators need to invent op-
tions for mutual gain. This is what constitutes the 
decision-making aspect ofthe strategy. (Wertheim 
et aI., 1992) insists brainstorming is one way of 
encouraging cooperative decision-making. Other 
approaches include Expanding the pie, awarding 
Compensation and Log-rolling. 
Compensation and Log-rolling are similar 
in that both seek to resolve differences between 
disputants in their interests and preferences. An 
interest is defined as what a person truly desires 
from a situation, consisting of a person's wants, 
needs, concerns and fears. An agreement is far 
more likely if at least some ofthese interests are 
satisfied in the final agreement. Compensation 
allows for parties to be rewarded as a method 
to promote fairness in the final settlement. Log-
rolling does not assume compensation, entirely 
resting on considering priorities (and the differ-
ences between them) to form an agreement. We 
have attempted to model decision making by 
using a combination of log-rolling and compen-
sation strategies to support trade-off strategies, 
such as those employed in Family_Winner and 
Asset Divider. 
Insist on objective criteria. Some negotia-
tions are not susceptible to a win-win situation. 
The most obvious of these is haggling over the 
price of an item: since the more money one side 
negotiates, the less their opponent receives. In 
these cases, unbiased independent evaluations of 
an item will guide a price for the item that both 
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parties will agree on. Wherever appropriate, our 
research assumes the participants agree on ob-
jective criteria prior to the commencement of a 
negotiation. F or example, inAsset Di vider, parties 
are expected to enter the value of an item - it is 
assumed negotiators have sought advice on the 
price of an item, and this figure has been agreed 
to by both parties. 
Our expertise is in the domain of Australian 
F amity Law, and in particular divorce negotiation. 
As mentioned above, our work has concentrated 
on modelling how negotiations proceed in prac-
tise, using heuristics and other methods derived 
from professionals in the area. Systems such as 
Family_Negotiator accept single offers around 
priorities in its attempt to arrive at a solution that 
is likely to be accepted by both parties. Our later 
work, namely Asset Divider and Family _ Win-
ner, arrive at decisions by conducting a thorough 
analysis of user input, including priorities, likely 
trade-offs and rules. We use heuristics and other 
methods derived from practice to arrive at a solu-
tion both parties may find acceptable. In addition, 
our research has concentrated on the extension of 
template systems to systems capable of providing 
offers that are acceptable to both parties. 
Our laboratory has resulted in a number of 
NSS capable of supporting negotiation at varying 
degrees. Our earliest Negotiation Support System 
was Family_Negotiator. It utilises a hybrid rule-
based and case-based system to provide disputants 
with advice on how to best resolve issues in an 
Australian Family Law dispute. Whilst evaluat-
ing the Family_Negotiator system, we discovered 
Family Law did not lend itself to the use of either 
Case-based or Rule-based Reasoning. Nor did 
the overall framework of Family_Negotiator 
provide in-depth solutions expected from real-life 
negotiations. 
AdjustWinner(Bellucci & Zeleznikow, 1998), 
uses a utility function to achieve equal distribu-
tion of the common pool. The algorithm used in 
the system was the Adjusted Winner procedure 
(Brams & Taylor, 1996). AdjustWinner resolves 
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a dispute by dividing issues and items among 
disputants, through a mathematical manipulation 
of numeric preferences. Although not classed as a 
NSS, AdjustWinner provided the framework for 
decision-making support that was later incorpo-
rated into a NSS to form Family_Winner (Bellucci 
& Zeleznikow, 2006). 
Family_Winner is an interest based Negotia-
tion Support System that takes a common pool 
of items and distributes them between two par-
ties based on the value of associated ratings. The 
basic premise of the system is that it allocates 
items based on whoever values them more. Once 
an item has been allocated to a party, the ratings 
of the remaining items are modified (according 
to the actions of trade-offs) to ensure the items 
(and their associated ratings) are ready for the 
next round of allocation. The system implements 
a well known phenomenon in mediation, that 
disputants do often change their initial ratings in 
light ofthe allocation of a related issue. The system 
develops this aspect of face-to-face negotiation 
through trade-off manipulation and compensation 
strategies, developed from heuristics embedded 
in data. Family_Winner is synonymous with the 
practises offamily mediators. For example, Fam-
ily _ Winner can only operate on the assignment 
of ratings by parties (which indicate the relative 
importance of each issue to a disputant - apriority) 
and supports the sequential resolution of issues. 
Mediators involved in our data collection indicated 
they collected priority settings from their clients, 
and often resolved disputes by considering each 
issue separately. 
AssetDivider, developed as an extension of 
Family_Winner, provides support to asset divi-
sion. Family_Winner takes ratings assigned to 
items by the parties involved and develops a list 
of allocations to each party; based on trade-offs 
inherently present in the dispute. AssetDivider 
similarly develops a list of allocations based on 
tradeoffs, except it also takes into account the mon-
etaryvalue of assets and' accepts a percentage split 
(provided by the mediator or other user) to guide 
the development of an allocation list for parties. 
The following sections will detail the theory 
of negotiation support in AssetDivider (based 
predominately on Family_Winner) and will 
demonstrate its actual use through a case study. 
AssetDivider 
AssetDivideruses the major principles underlying 
Family _Winner-namely in their use ofinterests. 
The theory which best supports our definition 
of negotiation support is Principled Negotiation 
(Fisher & Ury, 1991), developed under the Harvard 
Negotiation Project. It emphasizes parties look 
for mutual gains and focuses on the underlying 
values (or interests) that justify a disputant's posi-
tion' as opposed to attempting negotiation solely 
from their positions. 
Family_Winner takes a common pool ofitems 
and distributes them between two parties based 
on the value of associated ratings. Each item is 
listed with two ratings (a rating is posted by each 
party), which signify the item's importance to the 
party. A rating in Family_Winner is a number in 
value from 0 - 100 (0 being of no importance; 100 
to signify absolute importance). The algorithm 
to determine which items are allocated to whom 
works on the premise that each parties' ratings 
sum to 100; thereby forcing parties to set priori-
ties. The program always checks this is the case, 
and if not, it realigns ratings to ensure all sum to 
100. The system's basic rule of thumb is that it 
allocates items based on whoever values them 
more. Once an item has been allocated to a party, 
the ratings of the remaining items are modified 
(according to the actions of trade-offs) to ensure 
the items (and their associated ratings) are ready 
for the next round of allocation (Bellucci, 2004). 
Family_Winner was evaluated by a number 
of family solicitors at Victoria Legal Aid (VLA). 
Whilst the solicitors were very impressed with 
the way Family_Winner suggested trade-offs 
and compromises, they had one major concern 
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- that in focusing upon negotiation, the system 
had ignored the issues of justice (Zeleznikow & 
Bellucci, 2006). For example, Family_Winner 
simply allocates property to parties based on their 
interest in the item. It does not allow for monetary 
values to influence the allocation process. The 
dollar value of items is important to the dispute 
because each party wants to be allocated the right 
or 'just' amount of money. This concept contrasts 
with linking an interest value to an item, which is 
intrinsically different. An interest is an evaluation 
based on the significance of the item to a person. 
For example, party A may be very fond of a lamp 
that has been passed down throughout the genera-
tions, and consequently they give ita rating of 50. 
The remaining items are not as important to party 
A, and so are given much lower ratings. Whilst 
using interests to negotiate is a very interesting 
exercise, it does not in any way reflect the dollar 
value of the item. This is where Family_Winner 
fails to support the mediation process effectively. 
Whilst our industry partners, Relationships 
Australia Queensland (RAQ) consider the way 
Family_Winner supports interest-based negotia-
tion by setting priorities as useful; they were also 
concerned with the missing impact of monetary 
values. Hence, our new theory of negotiation 
support (implemented in AssetDivider) incorpo-
rates the basis of Family _Winner's allocation and 
trade-off strategy by utilizing both interests and 
an item's monetary value. 
THEORY IMPLEMENTED 
IN ASSETDIVIDER 
Whilst AssetDivider is a standalone system, 
many of the ideas used to form the system were 
a developed in Family_Winner. For this reason, 
we will be drawing attention to AssetDivider's 
differences and similarities in relation to Fam-
ily _ Winner. We will be assuming the reader has 
no prior knowledge of Asset Divider 's predecessor. 
326 
Family_Winner and AssetDivider's 
Input and Output 
Family_Winner takes a list of issues (usually items 
for distribution between two parties) and allocates 
them based on a rating given by the parties in 
dispute. Two sets of ratings are provide, one for 
each party in dispute. This rating (a numerical 
value between 0 and 100) does not represent the 
monetary value of the item, instead it symbolises 
how important the item is to the party. We as-
sume a party wants to keep an item they feel is 
important to them. 
Similarly, AssetDivider accepts a list of items 
together with ratings (two per item) to indicate 
the item's importance to a party. In addition it 
also accepts the current monetary value of each 
item in dispute. We assume this dollar value has 
been negotiated (if necessary) before AssetDi-
vider is used2• Hence, only one dollar value is 
entered per item. The proposed percentage split 
is also entered; this reflects what percentage of 
the common pool each party is likely to receive 
in the settlement. The system is not capable of 
determining the percentage split; this figure has 
to be derived from the mediator's knowledge 
in past cases or from computer systems such as 
SplitUp (Stranieri et aI, 1999), which can provide 
a percentage split given certain characteristics and 
features of divorce cases. 
AssetDivider's output consists ofa list of items 
allocated to each party. All of the items (except 
one) on the allocation lists were provided by dis-
putants in the intake screen. The additional item 
is a "payout" item, which reflects the amount of 
money a disputant would need to pay the other 
party for the items they have been allocated and 
collectively are valued greater than the percent-
age split offers them. For example, party A have 
been allocated a total value of$l 00,000 in assets, 
and party B $115, 000. Under a 50/50% split, 
party B will need to pay $15,000 to party A to 
satisfy the percentage split. Family_Winner in 
contrast does not accommodate payouts since its 
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focus was to distribute items determinate on only 
interest ratings. 
Family_Winner and AssetDivider's 
Allocation Strategy 
The order by which issues are allocated is of para-
mount importance in a negotiation. Professional 
mediators have indicated issues attracting little 
disputation should be presented foremost for al-
location, so as to help foster a positive environment 
in which to negotiate. By summing the ratings of 
issues to 100, the level of discourse surrounding 
an issue can be measured by calculating the nu-
merical distance between the ratings of an issue 
assigned by each of the parties. For example, 
if two parties assign the same high rating to an 
item, then it is expected the level of disputation 
surrounding the issue to be substantial (because 
both parties want the item), whereas large dif-
ferences between the ratings of parties indicate 
the issue will be resolved much more quickly. 
Both Family_Winner and AssetDivider use this 
strategy in deciding the order by which items are 
presented for allocation. 
Family_Winner allocates items to parties ac-
cording to whoever values them the most. Once an 
item has been allocated to a party, the remaining 
ratings (of items still in dispute) are changed by 
trade-off equations. These modifications try to 
mimic the effect losing or gaining an item will 
have on the rest of the items still in dispute. The 
equations directly modify ratings by comparing 
each rating against that of the item recently lost 
or won (each party's set of ratings are modified 
as a result of an allocation). The equations update 
ratings based on a number of variables - whether 
the item allocated was lost or gained, the value 
of the allocated item in relation to items still in 
dispute and the value of the item whose rating 
will change as a result. In Family_Winner, the 
extent to which ratings were modified was deter-
mined through an analysis of data we collected 
from mediation cases provided by the Australian 
Institute of Family Studies. These are detailed in 
(Bellucci, 2004). 
AssetDivider accepts items, a rating per issue 
and the monetary value of an item (unlike Fam-
ily _ Winner, which does not consider the monetary 
value of items at all). The allocation strategy as 
described above is similar in Family_Winner, 
except that the equations have been modified to 
reflect greater fairness by considering the price 
of an item. AssetDivider's allocation strategy 
works by provisionally allocating an item to the 
party whose rating is the highest. It then checks 
the dollar value of items it has been allocated 
previously (that is, their current list of items), the 
dollar value of the item presently allocated and 
the dollar amount permitted under the percentage 
split given by mediators. Ifby allocating the item 
in question the party exceeds its permitted amount, 
the item is removed from its allocation list and 
placed back into negotiation. In this case, the item 
has not been allocated to a party. Ifthe dollar value 
of the item was within the limits of the amount 
permitted under the percentage split rule, then 
the allocation proceeds. Once an allocation has 
occurred the 'losing party' is compensated by the 
trade-off equations modifying ratings (whereas in 
Family_Winner both winning and losing parties 
were affected). Analysis from the calculations in 
Family_Winner revealed it was not always fair 
to the losing side if the winning side received a 
higher rating. 
Family_Winner had also attracted some criti-
cism concerning the scaling of ratings to sum to 
100 only once (at the initial intake). After the 
system removed an item from the negotiation 
(upon allocation); it was argued that the remaining 
ratings in dispute should be scaled to 100 again. 
The reasoning here is to ensure that every item 
has been allocated with the same rules in place 
(that is all ratings add to 100) as was the case in 
the first item's allocation. Whilst theoretically 
this reasoning is quite sound; there was a prob-
lem with implementing this in practise. Once we 
implemented this new methodology, we found 
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that as the number of issues in dispute reduced, 
so did the difference between the ratings of the 
same item. This result defeated the reason why 
we introduced trade-offs in the first place, ie 
trade-offs should cause some effect. It is also a 
problem when ratings are dissimilar because we 
do not know to which party we should allocate 
the item. The reason why AssetDivider does not 
scale all ratings to 100 following allocation is to 
ensure the ratings still reflect disputant priorities 
set in the first instance. The trade-off equations 
allow for small changes to apply to ratings, and 
it is these changes that decide to who the item 
will be allocated. 
User Interface Issues 
In comparing user interface issues between the 
two systems, significant improvements have been 
made to AssetDivider. There is more space on the 
screen for users (we presume will be Mediators 
or lawyers) to enter additional information about 
the case. We have added reporting services, which 
will print case details such as case identifiers 
(case number), initial ratings given by users, rat-
ings upon allocation and a final summary of the 
solutions arrived at by the system. This summary 
will include the list of allocated items and their 
associated monetary value of each party. 
In Family_Winner, diagrams were shown on 
screen to describe the current 'state of play' , that 
is the items in dispute, their values (ratings), and 
Relationship Ratings (RR) between items. Rela-
tionship ratings are used to reflect the importance 
a party places on one item in relation to another. 
Mathematically, the RR is the absolute difference 
between the ratings oftwo items. We named these 
diagrams Trade-off Maps, which are based on 
the structure of Constraint Diagrams. They were 
shown on screen just before an allocation occurs 
to help users understand how Family_Winner 
allocates items. In developing AssetDivider, we 
decided not to include these Trade-off Maps, as 
informal discussions with users revealed they 
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simply helped to confuse users - and contrary 
to the reason why they were developed - did not 
aid user understanding of how the system arrived 
at its solution. In conjunction with displaying 
Trade-off Maps, Family_Winner would display 
new ratings as they change; that is every allocation 
was displayed sequentially on screen. This made 
using Family_Winner quite tedious; as the user 
had to clear each screen for every allocation that 
occurred. AssetDivider displays the solutions it 
has arrived at after all items have been allocated; 
at which point the user can choose to print or save 
the allocation list. 
In addition, the system has been designed so 
users can print a number of percentage split sce-
narios per case very easily. Once the information 
pertaining to a case has been entered, the user can 
press the back button on the screen to arrive at 
the screen where the user can change the percent-
age split, and then press the 'allocate' button on 
the next screen to see the results. As a mediator 
commented to us; it is a very useful feature if it 
allows clients to view allocation lists given dif-
ferent percentage split scenarios. 
Demonstration of AssetDivider 
AssetDivider is a decision support tool to help 
mediators develop scenarios very quickly for the 
resolution of property mediations in family law. 
The program accepts as input data pertaining to 
a single case, and with only a couple of screens, 
is able to generate a list of property allocations 
to each party. The user will need to enter the fol-
lowing information: 
1. A list of items in dispute together with 
ratings (two per item), which indicate the 
importance or priority of an item to a party. 
There is a slider bar which can be used to 
enter a number, or one can enter the number 
directly in the grid. The rating can be any 
number (except 0 ifboth parties enter 0 for 
an item). Users should be aware the program 
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wi 11 take the ratings of a party and scale them 
to 100 for the purposes of the calculations 
made by Asset Divider. It might be easier to 
interpret the results ifusers enter the ratings 
so that a party's rating list adds to (or near 
to) 100. 
2. The current . monetary value of each item 
in dispute. We assume the dollar value has 
been negotiated prior to Asset Divider's use. 
Hence, only one dollar value is entered per 
item. 
3. Apercentage splitis also entered; this reflects 
what percentage of the common pool each 
party is to receive in this scenario. 
The program also allows for the entry of iden-
tifying information, such as names, comments and 
descriptions of the case. This data is optional, as 
the program only requires data 1- 3 stated above 
to calculate allocations. 
Asset Divider's output consists of a list of items 
allocated to each party. All of the items (except 
one) on the allocation lists were provided in the 
intake screen by the disputants. The additional 
item is a "payout" item, which reflects the amount 
of money a disputant would need to pay the other 
party for the items they have been allocated and 
collectively are valued greater than the percentage 
split offers them. 
AN EXAMPLE USING ASSETDIVIDER 
The case description of this real-life divorce 
scenario and the relative point allocations have 
been extracted from (Brams & Taylor, 1996) page 
105. The case Jolis v Joiis, began on December 
5th, 1980, and concluded on October 30th, 1981. 
The case was heard in New York City, at a time 
when a new law subjecting all martial property to 
a 50 -50 split was being introduced. The couple 
had been married for 41 years, of which 33 they 
spent together. The Wife had given up her early 
and successful career to care for the couple's four 
sons. The couple had lived together in substantial 
wealth, primarily due to the expansion of the 
Husband's diamond business. 
There are both real estate and liquid assets 
to be divided. The Husband's diamond business 
is not treated as marital property as its growth 
was primarily due to market forces, especially 
the diamond boom of the 1970's. The children's 
welfare is not included as an issue as they are no 
longer considered minors at the time of separation. 
The following screens details the presentation 
ofthe above mentioned case to AssetDivider. The 
relevant case information is entered in the intake 
screen (Figure 1). 
The next screen (Figure 2) appears once the 
user clicks on Next». It is also the final screen 
of the program. In this screen, users are able to 
enter their ratings. Once the user clicks "Allocate 
Items", the allocation summary is filled appro-
priately. In the Allocation Summary table, ratings 
for Husband (party A) and Wife (party B) are 
scaled to add to 1 00 in columns "Party A Rating" 
and "Party B Rating" respectively. It is then these 
ratings that are used to drive the allocation. In this 
case, the ratings initially entered add to 100. 
Table 1. Point allocations and dollar valuations 
(Brams & Taylor, 1996), page 105 
Issues H's W's Dollar value of 
ratings ratings asset 
Paris Apartment 35 55 $642,856 
Paris Stud io 6 I $42,850 
New York Coop 8 I $103,079 
Farm 8 I $119,200 
Cash And Receiv- 5 6 $42,972 
abIes 
Securities 18 17 $176,705 
Profit Sharing 15 15 $120,940 
Plan 
Life Insurance 5 4 $24,500 
Policy 
Total 100 100 $1,273,102 
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Figure 1. Intake screen for negotiation 
II Relotiol1ships Au. trali. Oueensland [vatuotioll version · Asset Divider 
~=----"------"-J ~~~-=====~ ... =~~~==] 
Percentage Split reqoostsd (n furm of AlB) i~~~] I r~=B .. ] 
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............. ...... .......................................................................... ....... ........ ......................... .. ....... . ,.'." I AcxHtsm 
Item Name Item liar ValJe I Delete Item 
Figure 2. Final screen of AssetDivider. It gives the user the allocation list for each party; which includes 
a payout figure allocated accordingly 
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The Allocation Summary lists another issue, 
which is not initially part of the negotiation. It is 
the payout figure, which is used to ensure the 
parties received their portion of the percentage 
split, entered in the first screen. 
Once the user presses the button "PrintAlloca-
tion", the following report is produced. 
According to AssetDivider, the preferred out-
come, taking into account each party's' priorities 
(ratings) and percentage split indicated: 
In analysing the case, we can see that both 
parties wanted the Paris Apartment above all else; 
though Wife (party B) valued it more than the 
husband (Party A). As a consequence, both parties 
gave the rest of the items relatively low values. 
On the whole, both parties received the items they 
valued considerably (except for Party A's loss of 
Paris Apartment to Party B - since she valued it 
Figure 3. Allocation report for Jolis vs. Jolis 
much greater). The only item valued equally by 
the parties was profit-sharing plan (15). It was 
given to Party B. Party B also need to payout 
Pmty A the amount of 170,217 to ensure the split 
is exactly 50%. 
AssetDivider allows users to quickly gener-
ate different allocation lists for the same case, 
by allowing the percentage split in screen 1 to 
be modified as appropriate. Mediators at RAQ 
commented it is often useful to present clients 
with a number of scenarios, which detail exactly 
what items (or lack of) form part of their percent-
age split. It may be the case clients take a lower 
percentage if it means they do not have a debt to 
repay, for example. 
To generate different allocation lists for the 
same user, the user must press on the « Back 
button to make a change in the percentage split 
C8selO: 7 Date Created: 11-February~20l0 
Oescrfption: 
IlOlttv,lJtlS 
Comments: 
Percentage SpIt 
Party A SpIt Party 9 SpIt 
50.00 I 50,00 
Party A AIocatod 
lssue~Uon DoI¥V .... Percentage Yalue 
PA'fOOT $ 170.211.00 13.37 % 
Life Jnstrance polICy $ 24,500.00 1.92% 
Se(lJ'lties $ 176,705.00 13.00% 
F",m $ 119,200.00 9,36% __ Coop 
$ 103,0]9.00 9.10% 
PcrisStudio $ "12,850,00 3.37% 
Sub Total : $ 636,551.00 50.00 % 
Party B AIocated 
Issue Description DoI¥v .... Percentage value 
PAVOJT ~$170,217 .00 -13.37% 
R'Ofrt shart'g Plan $ 120,940.00 9.50% 
cash cnj Rec:eh'ables $ 42,972.00 3.3891. 
ParIS" Apartment $ 642,656,00 SO,50~ 
Sub Total: $ 636,.551.00 50.00 .. 
Grand Total: $ 1.213~ 102.o0 
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Table 2. Allocation list for husband (party A) and wife (party B) using AssetDivider 
Husband (Party A) Value of Wife (Party 8) Value of 
Fann $119,200 Paris Apartment $642,856 
New York Coop $103,079 Cash and receivables $42,972 
Paris Studio $42,850 Profit Sharing Plan $120,940 
Life Insurance Policy $24,500 
Securities $176,705 
Payout $170,217 -$170,217 
Total: $636,551 Total: $636551 
window, then move to the next screen by press-
ing the » Next button and press the "Allocate 
items" button to enable the changes to affect the 
allocation. The table "Allocate Summary" is then 
populated accordingly. For example, the percent-
age split box in Figure 1 is changed from 50/50 
to 40/60. The following screen (Figure 4) shows 
the result of a 40/60 percentage split (given all 
other data remains constant). 
The con-esponding report follows. (see Figure 
8) 
In this scenario, it is clear that the amount of 
money Party B must pay to party A is greatly 
reduced - from 170,217 to 42,906. Hence, the 
parties may agree to this settlement if neither 
wants a substantial amount of debt in the settle-
ment. 
Figure 4. Allocation Summary screen for Jolis v.Jolis case; percentage split is 40160 
~ Allocation Summary ~lQ)rEl 
('.sst' No: 7 Description: Jolis \/. Jolis 
Enter ratings for Party A Enter ratings for Party B 
~1~It~~.~~~ __ ~P~~Y~A~R~ __ ~ ~ hrl~I~~~~~~ ___ ~I'PMN~~A~RNM~~ ¢ 
~~~:~~·~-~7--~~_·····_··-_--_····_····~r_· ··_·· ···-.... -.----... --.-~ ,. ~._b::~~7.~~~~~----_r.!~--------~ 
New York Coop 6 New York Coop ! 1 
'---_DeIe!_e R_em_--,I I Refresh Grlds II Divide Item 
AlocatJon SUmmary 
New VorkCoop $103,079.00 16•10 ,p",ty A 
Pori< Studio $12,BSO ,00 3.37 Porty A 
________ . _____ ... _.~_. __ . __ ,I=<=<=.Bi£=k:__'.IIPrWAIoc- 11 C~a 
AiIo<:otion Complete:. P .. tyA oIIocotod 10.00% and Porty B oIocoted 60,00% 
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Figure 5. Reportfor Jolis vs. Jolis case; percentage split is 40160 
easolD: 7 
Description: 
POliS v. Jolts 
Comments: 
Percentage SplIt 
P..-ty It. SpIt Party B SpIt 
40.00 I 60.00 
Party A Ahated 
Issue~tIon 
PA'I'QUT 
ute Insu'.n:e Policy 
Seaxiti9s 
Farm 
--COOp 
PartsSll..dio 
Party B AIocated 
Issue Description 
PA'I'QUT 
Profit sharrg Plan 
cash ~ Recel¥ables 
PariS Apartment 
Fairness and Successful 
Decision Making 
SUbTotal: 
Sl.tI Total: 
Grand Total : 
IlCIIar Value 
$, 42,905.BO 
l24.SOO.00 
$ 176,705.00 
$ 119,2CO.00 
$ 103,079,00 
$: 42,SSO.OO 
$: 509,2"0.80 
IlCIIarvalue 
· $42,906.00 
l12O.9<O.OO 
$: 42,972.00 
$: 642,856.00 
$ 763,861.20 
$ 1.273,102.00 
Brams and Taylor (Brams & Taylor, 1996) view 
fairness in a negotiation as ensuring each party 
receives an equal percentage of their priorities. 
The Adjusted Winner algorithm (Brams & Taylor, 
1996) guarantee fairness and equitability by en-
suring an equal number of points (represented by 
issue ratings) are awarded to each party through 
a distribution of issues or items. 
In an ideal environment, where fairness can 
be applied with definite certainty, the theories of 
(Brams & Taylor, 1996) and (Pruitt & Carnevale, 
1993) are sustainable. However, our goal of pro-
viding negotiation support does not easily lend 
itself to fairness assessrp.ent, due to: 
Percentage Value 
3.37% 
1.92,. 
13.881J'. 
9.36% 
8.10% 
3.37% 
40.00 ... 
Percentage value 
-3.37% 
9.50% 
3.38% 
SO.SO % 
60.00% 
1. The difficulty in assessing fairness to a 
system whose numerical values fluctuate 
during the course of negotiation; and 
2. A lack of data on which to base comparisons. 
Family_Winner nor Asset Divider employ 
any of the fairness principles mentioned above. 
It interprets fairness as how satisfied the parties 
are with the proposed allocation. We argue a dis-
putant's satisfaction is more important than their 
need for a supposedly fair outcome. The theories 
promoted in this chapter support satisfaction by 
allocating issues based on an issue's value to the 
party. Trade-offs are utilised to enable compensa-
tion, satisfying the system's attempt to make the 
allocation equally satisfactory to both parties. 
(Raiffa, 2002) describes prescriptive analysis 
as a modelling technique in negotiation, which we 
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have chosen to apply to the evaluation of NSS. 
Prescriptive analysis describes how real people 
benefit from advice to improve their behaviour. 
Advice ofthis kind must be evaluated by its prag-
matic value (by its ability to help people make 
better decisions). Our work evaluates success by 
judging the usefulness of a NSS to the (human) 
negotiation. 
We have developed two questionnaires (con-
ducted with Mediators) and an interview sched-
ule with managers, based on the CCCF System 
Operational Context (Hall & Zeleznikow, 2003). 
These ask users to comment on the operation and 
use of the system; 
1. Mediator Usage census, and 
2. Mediator Survey 
The mediator's usage census (1) above, is to 
assess how mediators use the program to assist 
in mediations. Ideally it should be filled in after a 
mediation has concluded (whether Asset Divider 
was used or not), and allows users to enter their 
thoughts on why Asset Divider was used (or why 
not), how it was used and their comments on its 
usefulness. 
The survey for mediators (2) should be filled 
out at the end of the trial (evaluation) period. It 
allows mediators to reflect on the appropriateness 
of the program, its user friendliness, quality and 
overall feel of its usefulness to family mediation. 
AssetDivider is yet to undergo an evaluation by 
our industry partners RAQ. It is expected media-
tors at RAQ will test and evaluate the system in 
the near future. We are also in negotiations with 
other organisations for the purposes of evaluation 
and commercial use of the software. We expect an 
extensive evaluation campaign to reveal further 
improvements to the decision making module and 
user interface. Our research has revealed a lack of 
negotiation support systems used in family law. 
We hope our collaboration with RAQ (or other 
organisations) will enableAssetDividerto be used 
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in practise, being the first negotiation support 
systems to do so. 
How well will AssetDivider support decision 
making? This question is difficult to answer with-
out a thorough evaluation of how AssetDivider 
has been used. Notwithstanding, on a recent visit 
to RAQ, we were told mediators may use the 
program to move clients away from trying to 
attain a particular percentage of the value of the 
common pool. Often lawyers or family friends 
may have provided this advice. There may also 
be issues with a 'loss of face' if they do not fight 
for a percentage they consider fair. The program 
used in this way will help clients see what items 
make up the given percentage split. They may 
move away from their initial position ifthey see 
what items (including the associated payout) 
they are likely to receive. Mediators believed if 
the program was used in this manner, it would 
greatly affect a party's decision making process. 
In addition, AssetDivider would provide me-
diators with confidence to effectively mediate 
property-related issues. Most family law media-
tors have degrees in social work or law. Their 
expertise mainly lies in mediating child-related 
issues such as visitation schedules, primary care 
and other associated child related matters. Access 
to AssetDivider may enable the settlement of both 
child-related and property issues by mediators; 
thereby reducing their reliance on lawyers and 
of course their often exuberant associated costs. 
AssetDivider's decision making capabilities may 
enable a mediator to confidently provide advice 
regarding asset division. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter discusses current research in Nego-
tiation Support Systems particularly in Family 
Law. Our survey demonstrates the wide number 
ofNSS by classifying existing systems into ADR, 
on-line, template and decision making support 
systems. We settle on Principled Negotiation 
Decision Support in Interest Based Negotiation Support Systems 
as our underlying theory to negotiation, and 
then demonstrate how we applied the theory's 
characteristics to a computer representation. 
Family_Winner and AssetDivider are examples 
of our laboratory's attempt to develop solutions 
which in part mimic and extend the negotiation 
process between divorcing couples. This chapter 
devotes most of its space to the development and 
demonstration of AssetDivider. It is our latest 
offering which limited informal evaluation has 
already revealed, will develop as a useful tool to 
family lawyers and mediators alike. 
Future work in negotiation support includes 
the development of a fully supported integrated 
negotiation support system, which allows for the 
negotiation of all issues in family mediation -
including asset division and child related issues. 
The demand for such a service is unquestionable; 
as is the current demand for family lawyers and 
mediators. With extensive research, it is believed 
the development of an all-encompassing nego-
tiation environment will help resolve disputes 
quickly and cheaply. 
Other ideas centre on the use of AssetDivider 
in different domains. It may be possible to use 
AssetDivider (or a derivative) to mediate in the 
dissolution of companies, or in the division of 
a person's estate once they have passed on - as 
long as there are two stakeholders involved. This 
brings us to another point - if we are to move into 
the development of mediating or division type 
systems, our research will need to move into 
multi person dispute resolution. To date we have 
resisted this direction, simply due to the myriad 
of complexity it brings to the table. 
In March 2008, we commenced a large research 
grant from the Australian Research CounciP, to 
work with the Queensland Branch of Relation-
ships Australia, to develop a negotiation decision 
support system using both interested-based and 
justice-based negotiation. 
Online dispute resolution makes it possible 
to provide family law'services to parties who are 
geographically dispersed. In such circumstances, 
the process of separation and divorce could histori-
cally feature a large amount of correspondence and 
expensive litigation. Australia is both a country 
and a continent, the population is geographically 
spread and a part ofthe popUlation lives in remote 
regions. The provision of government services to 
such communities is both difficult and expensive. 
To meet such needs the Australian Government 
initiated the Family Relationship Advice Line 
(FRAL)4. The Advice Line is a national telephone 
service established to assist people affected by 
relationship or separation issues. The Advice 
Line provides information on family relationship 
issues and advice on parenting arrangements after 
separation. FRAL can also refer callers to local 
services that can provide assistance. 
In a major addition to traditional family 
dispute resolution services, FRAL provides the 
organisation of telephone dispute resolution for 
people assessed as more appropriate for the tele-
phone medium than for face-to-face services. The 
Telephone Dispute Resolution Service (TDRS) 
was established through funding from the Fed-
eral Attorney General of the Australian Govern-
ment in 2007 (Thomson, 2009) and is based in 
Queensland, operated by Relationships Australia 
(Qld) in partnership with Relationships Australia 
(NSW). Potential clients cannot directly contact 
or self refer to the TDRS; rather they need to be 
referred either through the Family Relationship 
Advice Line, a Family Relationships Centre, or 
any other government-funded Family Dispute 
Resolution provider. 
Online Family Dispute Resolution services 
potentially broaden the options and capacity of 
existing services by offering another method of 
supporting families to reach agreements. Given 
that most people in disputes about the care of 
children are under 45, arguably, 95% of the 
disputants will have familiarity with and access 
to the appropriate technology. For those who do 
not have access, the technology could conceiv-
ably become readily available at locations such 
as local libraries, Community Legal Centres or 
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Family Relationship Centres. Furthermore, such 
an approach could include provision of mobile 
resources in centres or hire facilities. Compared 
to the costs oflitigation or even prolonged alterna-
tive dispute resolution, the investment in online 
technologies is potentially both value adding and 
cost saving. 
In conjunction with Relationships Australia 
Queensland, we are developing an Online Family 
Dispute Resolution Service. 
We are investigating principles for the suc-
cessful negotiation of Information Technology 
Outsourcing Agreements (Chandar & Zeleznikow, 
2009). 
Currently we are about to commence two 
projects that investigate the fairness and con-
sistency of negotiation support systems in the 
legal domain. In a project with title 'Developing 
negotiation support systems in law which encour-
age more consistent and principled outcomes' we 
argue that unless negotiation support systems 
are seen to advocate outcomes which arise from 
consistent and principled advice, disputants will 
be reluctant to use them. Thus we propose con-
ducting research that will develop measures for 
assessing the outcomes of online negotiation in 
the legal domains of sentencing, plea bargaining 
and family mediation. Such measures will form 
the basis of a new model for evaluating justice 
and consistency within online dispute resolution 
systems. The model will inform the construction 
of fairer and more consistent systems ofIT-based 
negotiation support in the future. 
To meet this goal we will: 
1. Develop models of consistency and justice 
based on two very distinct legal domains: 
sentencing and family law. Further, the 
knowledge about these domains will be 
shared from three distinct Common Law 
jurisdictions: Australia, Israel and USA. 
2. Develop information retrieval techniques 
to extract knowledge from textual legal and 
negotiation data. 
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3. Use KDD techniques (such as association 
rules, Bayesian belief networks and neural 
networks) to compare litigated and negoti-
ated family law cases. 
4. Develop models of disputation and ne-
gotiation in both family law and sentenc-
ing. These models will then be tested to 
examine how closely they align with the 
notion of Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law (as compared to 'pure' interest-based 
negotiation). 
5. Use Lodder and Zeleznikow's three step 
model for an Online Dispute Resolution 
Environment and Toulmin's theory of ar-
gumentation to construct a generic online 
dispute resolution environment. The devel-
opment of such an environment on which to 
place various negotiation support systems 
will increase users' access to justice. 
6. Develop and evaluate specific sentencing 
and negotiation support systems using our 
newly developed Online Dispute Resolution 
Environment. 
While producing significant information 
technology and socio-Iegal advances, the project 
also develops innovative artificial intelligence 
techniques to help develop 'consistent' and 'just' 
negotiation support systems and an environment 
for online dispute resolution. 
(Gray et aI., 2007) argue that rather than de-
velop negotiation support systems that are useful 
in resolving legal disputes, it is more important to 
develop systems that provide advice about how 
to avoid conflicts. In domains such as family law 
and body corporate disputes, it is important for 
the disputants to have ongoing relationships once 
the disputes have been resolved. Hence it is vital 
to develop software that focuses upon developing 
ongoing relationships, rather than focusing upon 
interests,justice (using BATNAs) or power. Nego-
tiation support systems that incorporate machine 
learning and planning can help in this regard. 
Decision Support in Interest Based Negotiation Support Systems 
The next few years will reveal our research 
directions, and together with the continued sup-
port of the NSS community, we hope to continue 
the all important work in developing research for 
use in Negotiation Support Systems. 
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ENDNOTES 
2 
4 
See www.pon.harvard.edu 
Sometimes the parties cannot agree on the 
monetary value of the item. In this case, 
mediators would reference standard objec-
tive tables and the like to reach a consensus. 
F or example, if parties are arguing over the 
value of a car, then mediators may access 
web sites that gave independent valuations, 
such as redbookcom.au. 
Linkage Project LP0882329 Developing 
negotiation decision support systems that 
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agd.nsf/Page/ Families_FamilyRelation-
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